Nationwide Injunctions by Weaver, Russell L.
FIU Law Review 
Volume 14 Number 1 Article 10 
2020 
Nationwide Injunctions 
Russell L. Weaver 
University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Russell L. Weaver, Nationwide Injunctions, 14 FIU L. Rev. 103 (2020). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
  NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
Russell L. Weaver* 
Conversation overheard in Heaven: “Saint Peter, Saint Peter, 
come quick, God thinks that he is a federal judge.”1  
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Although U.S. federal courts have issued nationwide injunctions for 
nearly half-a-century, such injunctions have become quite commonplace in 
recent decades.2 Although nationwide injunctions can be issued against 
private entities, they are commonly used to enjoin governmental entities 
(during both Democratic and Republican administrations) from enforcing 
laws and policies.3 The distinguishing feature of such injunctions is that they 
purport to apply not only to the named plaintiffs in the litigation but to 
everyone else who might be subject to the challenged law or regulation 
anywhere in the country. 
Scholarly views regarding the wisdom and desirability of nationwide 
injunctions vary. Some question the appropriateness of such injunctions. For 
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1 Unknown origin. 
2 Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 420 (2017) (suggesting that the national injunction is a “recent development in the history of equity” 
and one that did not become prominent until the second half of the twentieth century). 
3 See Monsanto v. Geersten Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 
U.S. 488 (2009); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. 
v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998); Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for 
Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183 (1991); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Walters 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest 
Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
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example, Professor Samuel Bray has flatly stated that federal court 
injunctions should protect “the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant” and “should 
not constrain the defendant’s conduct vis-a-vis nonparties.”4 Professor 
Douglas Laycock generally agrees, arguing that “the court in an individual 
action should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing an 
invalid regulation; the court should order only that the invalid regulation not 
be enforced against the individual plaintiff.”5 Others disagree. For example, 
Professor Amanda Frost has argued that in “some cases, nationwide 
injunctions are the only means to provide plaintiffs with complete relief, or 
to prevent harm to thousands of individuals who cannot quickly bring their 
own cases before the courts.”6 She identifies three categories of cases where 
she believes that nationwide injunctions are appropriate: when such 
injunctions “are the only method of providing the plaintiff with complete 
relief; when they are the only means of preventing irreparable injury to 
individuals similarly situated to plaintiffs; and when they are the only 
practical remedy because a more limited injunction would be chaotic to 
administer and would impose significant costs on the courts or others.”7 She 
argues that, when “nationwide injunctions can serve one or more of these 
goals, the benefits of such an injunction may outweigh the costs.”8 
This short article examines the wisdom and desirability of allowing trial 
courts to enter nationwide injunctions, as well as how such injunctions have 
fared in the U.S. Supreme Court.  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
Nationwide injunctions are a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, the 
“older English and American practice suggested that an injunction should 
restrain the defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis the plaintiff, not against the entire 
world.”9 In the U.S., no nationwide injunctions were issued in the nineteenth 
century.10 For example, in Georgia v. Atkins,11 the State of Georgia sought to 
challenge a federal tax imposed on it. In enjoining the tax, the court did not 
 
4 Bray, supra note 2, at 469. 
5 Howard Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They 
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 339 (2018) (internal quotations omitted) 
(“[C]ourts should not issue injunctions protecting beyond the plaintiffs to the case. An injunction in a 
constitutional case should protect the plaintiffs from government enforcement of the invalid law against 
them; it should not prohibit the government from enforcing the law against the universe of non-parties to 
the litigation, absent a new or broader injunction protecting them.”). 
6 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2018). 
7 Id. at 1090. 
8 Id. 
9 Bray, supra note 2, at 420. 
10 Id. at 428. 
11 Georgia v. Atkins, 10 F. Cas. 241 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1866). 
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enjoin the government from enforcing the tax against other states, or even 
specifically against the State of Georgia, but rather enjoined only the 
particular tax at issue in that case.12  
Professor Bray identifies the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Frothingham v. Mellon,13 as illustrating the early judicial aversion to 
nationwide injunctions.14 In that case, the Court emphasized the limited 
nature of federal court jurisdiction:  
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then 
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of 
the statute here under review but also in respect of every 
other appropriation act and statute whose administration 
requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may 
be questioned.15  
The Court emphasized that “no precedent sustaining the right to maintain 
suits like this has been called to our attention.”16  
Even the wave of injunctions issued against New Deal legislation in the 
1930s (some 1,600 injunctions in all) did not involve nationwide 
injunctions.17 Indeed, the only early injunction that departed from this 
approach was the lower-court injunction issued in Hammer v. Dagenhart,18 
but that injunction extended only to an entire federal district.19 
Despite the early “uncertainty” and “discomfort” with the idea of using 
national injunctions, such injunctions had become “an ordinary part of the 
remedial arsenal of the federal courts” by the 1980s and 1990s.20 Since then, 
courts have issued nationwide injunctions in an extraordinary array of 
contexts: to prevent the planting of an altered strain of alfalfa,21 to prohibit 
the U.S. Forest Service from exempting salvage timber sales from notice and 
comment processes,22 to prohibit protest activities at abortion clinics,23 to 
 
12 See Bray, supra note 2, at 428. 
13 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1923). 
14 See Bray, supra note 2, at 431–32. 
15 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487. 
16 Id. 
17 See Bray, supra note 2, at 434–35. 
18 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).  
19 See Bray, supra note 2, at 436 (“The federal district judge held the law unconstitutional and 
granted the injunction the plaintiffs requested—an injunction restraining the enforcement of the statute 
within the Western District of North Carolina. The injunction thus went further than merely prohibiting 
enforcement against the plaintiffs.”). 
20 See id. at 428. 
21 See Monsanto Co. v. Geersten Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010).  
22 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
23 See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006). 
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prohibit a credit union from expanding its field of membership,24 to enjoin 
the government from imposing release bonds on excludable aliens that barred 
them from seeking employment,25 to prohibit the Bureau of Land 
Management’s “land withdrawal review program,”26 to enjoin a regulation 
limiting the fees that could be paid to attorneys for handling service 
connected death or disability benefits cases,27 to enjoin a federal regulation 
that denied federal financial aid to students who failed to register for the 
draft,28 and to impose procedures on the government in cases involving old 
age and survivor benefits.29 
By the time of the Obama and Trump administrations, such injunctions 
were becoming commonplace. During the Obama administration, a Texas 
trial court issued nationwide injunctions against President Obama’s Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and his Deferred Action for Parents 
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA),30 as well as against 
his Department of Education’s interpretive guidance regarding the treatment 
of transgender students in public schools.31 During the Trump administration, 
such injunctions seem to be issued on almost a daily basis. For example, a 
judge entered an injunction against President Trump’s second Executive 
Order (EO) suspending for 90 days the right of nationals from six 
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States, suspending 
for 120 days the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), and 
decreasing refugee admissions by more than half.32 In another case, a trial 
court entered an injunction against President Trump’s order that indefinitely 
barred entry into the U.S. by nationals from six predominantly Muslim 
countries (Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad),33 and injunctions 
have been issued against a Trump administration order denying federal 
funding to sanctuary cities.34  
Why have nationwide injunctions become commonplace? Professor 
Bray points to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (FDJA),35 which was 
enacted in 1934. He believes that the FDJA encouraged courts to think about 
 
24 See Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998). 
25 See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183 
(1991). 
26 See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
27 See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
28 See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).  
29 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).  
30 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2015), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016). 
31 See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
32 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).  
33 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018). 
34 See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
35 The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2010). 
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the fundamental validity of statutes and to issue broad injunctions striking 
down those statutes.36 In other words, the FDJA promoted facial challenges 
to laws.37  
Bray also argues that judges have fundamentally changed the way that 
they respond to unconstitutional laws: from perceiving that they should strike 
down unconstitutional laws down as opposed to simply refusing to apply or 
enforce them.38 In other words, rather than viewing “courts as preventing or 
remedying a specific wrong to a person and only incidentally determining the 
constitutionality of a law, many now see the courts as determining the 
constitutionality of a law and only incidentally preventing or remedying a 
specific wrong to a person.”39 Bray suggests that these shifts have prompted 
courts to view themselves as vindicating constitutional rights on a national 
basis.40 Professor Frost seems to share Professor Bray’s views regarding why 
nationwide injunctions have become so common place. She argues that:  
At its core, the debate over nationwide injunctions is really 
a debate about the role of the federal courts in the 
constitutional structure. Are courts primarily intended to 
resolve disputes between the parties, or do they also declare 
the meaning of federal law for everyone? To what degree are 
courts intended to serve as a check on the political branches, 
and should their authority expand in lockstep with that of 
Congress and the President?41  
Bray also suggests that other considerations may have led to a 
proliferation of national injunctions.42 
 
36 See Bray, supra note 2, at 450. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 451. 
39 Id. 
40 That shift matters for the logic of the national injunction. If a court considers a statute 
inconsistent with the Constitution, and thus does not apply it, nothing follows about the remedy. The 
court has not done anything to the statute. It remains undisturbed. But on the newer conception of 
what a court does—striking down or setting aside an unconstitutional statute or unlawful 
regulation—a national injunction begins to have a relentless logic. If a court strikes down a statute, 
regulation, or order, why should it give it respect by allowing its continued enforcement? Wouldn’t 
enforcement, anywhere, offend the court’s determination that it was invalid, struck down, 
obliterated? If a law is unconstitutional in all its applications, why should the court permit it to be 
applied to anyone? Again, reasons can be given for stopping short—ones grounded in equitable 
remedies, judicial competence, humility, separation of powers, federalism, and so on. But the logic 
of the national injunction is certainly strengthened by the newer view of what judges do when one 
law is inconsistent with a higher one, as well as by the metaphorical language used to express that 
view. 
Id. at 452.  
41 Frost, supra note 6, at 1086–87. 
42 Bray, supra note 2, at 452–57. 
108 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:103 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: PRO AND CON 
But is it desirable or proper for courts to issue nationwide injunctions at 
all, much less routinely? There are arguments on both sides of the debate. 
A. The Need for Uniformity 
One argument that has been advanced in favor of nationwide injunctions 
is the need for uniform application of the laws, especially immigration laws.43 
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff in one jurisdiction contends that the 
current presidential administration (and, to be clear, I am not naming a 
particular president because it strikes me as preferable to consider the legal 
issues without regard to the particularity of who holds the presidency at a 
particular moment) has adopted a policy that is allegedly unconstitutional. 
The policy is challenged in one jurisdiction by individuals who claim to be 
aggrieved by that policy, and the trial court decides to issue an injunction 
against the policy. Arguably, if the government is enjoined in that 
jurisdiction, it is inappropriate to allow the government to continue to apply 
and enforce that policy in other jurisdictions. A nationwide injunction 
precludes the government from doing so by effectively decreeing that the 
policy cannot be enforced nationwide.44  
Professor Amanda Frost states the idea a bit differently:  
Without nationwide injunctions, the federal courts would be 
powerless to protect thousands or millions of people from 
potentially illegal or unconstitutional government policies—
policies that can be applied with minimal notice or process, 
and to many who lack the ability to bring their individual 
cases before the courts. The need for such injunctions is 
particularly great in an era when major policy choices are 
increasingly made through unilateral executive action 
affecting millions.45 
B. Should Trial Courts Be Imposing Nationwide Uniformity? 
On the surface, this “uniformity” argument seems to make sense. If a 
law or policy is unconstitutional, then it seems inappropriate to allow the 
government to enforce that policy in other jurisdictions where suits have not 
been brought against such policies. The difficulty with the uniformity 
 
43 See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 338. 
44 See id. at 356–59. 
45 Frost, supra note 6, at 1069. 
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argument is that, in a surprising number of cases, trial courts have “gotten it 
wrong” in their analysis of the legal issues. In other words, they issued 
nationwide injunctions that should not have been issued, and therefore 
imposed “nationwide uniformity” based on incorrect or unsound reasoning. 
Many of these nationwide injunctions have been vacated or modified by the 
U.S. Supreme Court but not before paralyzing government for a considerable 
period of time.46  
Examples of erroneous nationwide injunctions abound. For example, in 
Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,47 the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare attempted to recoup overpayments made to 
beneficiaries under the Social Security Act. The beneficiaries sued claiming 
that they were entitled to a hearing before an assessment was made against 
them and asked the court to certify a nationwide class and issue an injunction. 
The lower court did. However, the U.S. Supreme Court found the “District 
Court’s analysis of this issue totally unconvincing, and quite lacking in the 
deference which ought to be shown by any federal court in evaluating the 
constitutionality of an Act of Congress.”48 Indeed, the Court went on to hold 
that the trial court decision inappropriately frustrated the congressional 
objective of keeping the proceeding simple, and in fact would have greatly 
complicated the process.49 In other words, the trial court decision created 
uniformity across the nation, but the result was uniform inaccuracy.  
There are lots of other examples where trial court judges have issued 
erroneous rulings. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group50 involved a suit by male college students challenging a 
federal statute which denied federal student aid to students who failed to 
register for the draft. The trial court issued a nationwide injunction, finding 
multiple constitutional violations. In addition to concluding that the law 
 
46 See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (overturning the 
injunction in part); Monsanto v. Geersten Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006); Immigration & 
Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183 (1991); Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985); 
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).  
47 Walters, 473 U.S. 305. 
48 Id. at 326 (“Thus, even apart from the frustration of Congress’ principal goal of wanting the 
veteran to get the entirety of the award, the destruction of the fee limitation would bid fair to complicate 
a proceeding which Congress wished to keep as simple as possible.”). 
49 Id. at 326 (“It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were permitted to retain compensated 
attorneys the day might come when it could be said that an attorney might indeed be necessary to present 
a claim properly in a system rendered more adversary and more complex by the very presence of lawyer 
representation. It is only a small step beyond that to the situation in which the claimant who has a factually 
simple and obviously deserving claim may nonetheless feel impelled to retain an attorney simply because 
so many other claimants retain attorneys. And this additional complexity will undoubtedly engender 
greater administrative costs, with the end result being that less Government money reaches its intended 
beneficiaries.”). 
50 Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. at 844. 
110 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:103 
constituted an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, the court found that the law 
infringed the students’ privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. 
Supreme Court flatly repudiated the trial court’s analysis of the constitutional 
claims, concluding that the statute was constitutional, that there was no Bill 
of Attainder,51 and that there was no violation of the plaintiffs’ privilege 
against self-incrimination.52 As a result, the Court vacated the injunction.  
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,53 the trial court 
imposed a nationwide injunction restricting protest activities near abortion 
clinics anywhere in the nation. The ruling was based on a federal statute54 
that prohibited the use of violence in an effort to extort or rob. In Scheidler, 
there were claims that anti-abortion protestors had engaged in violence, but 
there was no claim that they had done so in order to extort or rob. As a result, 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had misconstrued and 
misapplied the federal statute, and therefore the Court vacated the nationwide 
injunction.  
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. National Center for 
Immigrants Rights, Inc.,55 a trial court issued a nationwide injunction 
precluding the government from enforcing a regulation requiring that release 
bonds for excludible aliens contain a condition barring them from seeking 
employment. Among other things, the court held that the regulation was 
inconsistent with the agency’s governing statute and deprived aliens of the 
right to due process. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the nationwide 
injunction on the basis that the agency did not violate its statutory authority.56 
 
51 Id. at 856 (“[W]ithin the meaning of Bill of Attainder Clause, we hold that the District Court 
erred in striking down § 12(f) as an impermissible attainder.”). 
52 Id. at 856–57 (“However, a person who has not registered clearly is under no compulsion to 
seek financial aid; if he has not registered, he is simply ineligible for aid. Since a nonregistrant is bound 
to know that his application for federal aid would be denied, he is in no sense under any ‘compulsion’ to 
seek that aid. He has no reason to make any statement to anyone as to whether or not he has registered.”). 
53 Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006). 
54 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2019). 
55 Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183 
(1991). 
56 The Court did not reach the constitutional issue because it was not considered or relied on by 
the court of appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s decision. In regard to the statutory issue, the Court 
concluded that: 
Taken together all of these administrative procedures are designed to ensure that aliens detained and 
bonds issued under the contested regulation will receive the individualized determinations mandated 
by the Act in this context. For these reasons, we conclude that 8 CFR § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1991) is 
consistent with the Attorney General’s statutory authority under § 242(a) of the INA.  
Id. at 195.  
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C. Promoting Judicial Economy 
Another argument made in favor of nationwide injunctions is that they 
promote “judicial economy.”57 The idea is that, if a law is unconstitutional, 
rather than force a multitude of lawsuits all over the county, it is preferable 
to have a single judge hear and decide the issue. The actions of that single 
court obviate the need for numerous courts all over the country to consider 
and decide the same issue. 
The judicial economy argument was prominent in the analysis of the 
lower courts in the Califano case. The district court decided to certify a 
nationwide class composed of “all individuals eligible for [old-age and 
survivors’ benefits] whose benefits have been or will be reduced or otherwise 
adjusted without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.” The court of 
appeals held that it would be inappropriate to require the recipients to sue 
individually because that would result in an unnecessary duplication of 
actions.58 In the appellate court’s view, the “issues involved are common to 
the class as a whole. They turn on questions of law applicable in the same 
manner to each member of the class,” and the court decided that it is “unlikely 
that differences in the factual background of each claim will affect the 
outcome of the legal issue.”59 Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that 
the certification of a nationwide class-action “saves the resources of both the 
courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every social 
security beneficiary to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.”60 
D. Judicial Economy or Precipitous Review? 
However, it is not clear that the “judicial economy” argument is sound. 
In Califano, both the appellate court and the trial court mis-analyzed the case 
and issued a nationwide injunction when one should not have been issued. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, because the injunction was 
issued on a nationwide basis, the actions of the lower courts forced the U.S. 
Supreme Court to become prematurely, indeed precipitously, involved in the 
case. 
Professor Frost cites the case of Trump v. International Refugee 
Assistance Project61 as an example of a situation when a nationwide 
injunction would be appropriate.62 However, one can argue that Trump 
 
57 Wasserman, supra note 5, at 338. 
58 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 690 (1979). 
59 Id. at 701. 
60 Id. 
61 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
62 Frost, supra note 6, at 1099. 
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illustrates the exact opposite. Because a nationwide injunction had been 
issued in that case, the case hurtled through the lower courts at a precipitous 
pace. After several lower courts enjoined enforcement of a Trump executive 
order, the Court agreed to hear the government’s request for a stay of the 
injunction on an expedited basis. Although the lower court rulings were not 
rendered until late May, a petition for certiorari was filed on June 1 and the 
Court directed that responses to the request for stay be filed just eleven days 
later on June 12. The Court rendered its decision on the stay just fifteen days 
later on June 27.  
In Trump, the lower court’s injunction allowed certain types of 
individuals to enter the country who would not ultimately prevail in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Indeed, the Trump Court stayed important parts of the trial 
court’s injunction. In particular, it stayed: (1) the preliminary injunctions 
preventing enforcement of 90-day suspension of entry into the United States 
with respect to foreign nationals who lacked any bona fide relationship with 
a person or entity in United States, (2) it stayed the preliminary injunctions 
that stayed enforcement of a 120-day suspension of entry into the U.S. by 
refugees, and (3) it stayed preliminary injunctions against enforcement of an 
annual limit on refugee admissions with respect to refugees who lacked any 
bona fide relationship with a person or entity in United States. So, the net 
effect was that the lower court’s order erroneously allowed several classes of 
individuals to enter the United States who should not have been allowed to 
enter. 
Likewise, in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group, a case involving individuals who challenged the denial of 
federal student assistance because of their refusal to register for the draft, the 
case came quite rapidly to the U.S. Supreme Court.63 The trial court issued a 
nationwide injunction on June 16, 1983, and the case was before the U.S. 
Supreme Court on a request for stay on June 29, 1983. In other words, only 
thirteen days later. Thereafter, the Court heard and resolved the case. In other 
words, because the trial court issued a nationwide injunction, the case was 
not able to percolate its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
  In most cases, a more deliberate pace might arguably be preferable. In 
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,64 the U.S. Supreme 
Court quickly involved itself because the trial court purported to enjoin the 
operation of a federal law “across the country and under all circumstances.”65 
As a result, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case on an 
expedited basis. A concurring Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun, 
argued that the trial court “abused its discretion” in issuing a nationwide 
 
63 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984).  
64 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
65 Id. at 319. 
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injunction.66 Under the circumstances, she agreed that “expeditious” review 
of the case was warranted,67 in part because the case was not framed as a class 
action and did not present itself as a “complex case.”68 She felt that the 
plaintiffs’ claims should have been considered individually.69 A dissenting 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, suggested that the Court should 
have refused to hear an interlocutory appeal of a nationwide injunction. He 
argued that it is important to have a full development of the case so that 
appellate decisions can be fully informed:  
where “grave, far-reaching constitutional questions” are 
presented: the records developed in preliminary-injunction 
cases are “simply insufficient” to allow a final decision on 
the merits; as a matter of fairness the litigants are entitled to 
a full evidentiary presentation before a final decision is 
reached; and where questions of constitutional law turn on 
disputed fact, such decisions must initially be rendered by a 
district court factfinder.70  
In Walters, the Court’s unwillingness to delay review was undoubtedly 
attributable to the fact that the trial court decided to enjoin application of the 
regulation “across the country and under all circumstances,” rather than to 
simply decide the case before it. 
E. Development of the Record 
Also cutting against the uniformity argument is the fact that nationwide 
injunctions can have an adverse effect on the development of the law. 
Historically, the government has exercised the ability to “non-acquiesce” in 
a lower court decision. When the government “non-acquiesces,” it agrees to 
follow the trial court’s holding in that particular jurisdiction (e.g., if the order 
is issued by U.S. District Court, the government agrees to follow the order in 
that district) but reserves the right to maintain the rejected position in 
litigation in other jurisdictions. When the decision is rendered by a U.S. Court 
of Appeals, the government might agree to acquiesce in that particular circuit 
but not in other circuits. 
Non-acquiescence plays a very positive role in the judicial process 
because it helps provide the U.S. Supreme Court with a fuller and more 
developed record and arguments. As more and more judges hear and decide 
the issues presented, they clarify the issues and facts and help sharpen the 
 
66 Id. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 337.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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legal analysis. If all lower courts agree regarding the resolution, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will frequently refuse to involve itself in the case. On the 
other hand, if the lower courts disagree, then the facts and issues are often 
sharpened by conflicting lower court decisions. In other words, adversarial 
litigation helps ensure that the U.S. Supreme Court receives a more highly 
developed record. 
The U.S. Supreme Court made precisely this point in Califano v. 
Yamasaki.71 Although the Court upheld aspects of a nationwide injunction in 
that case, it conceded “the force of the Secretary’s contentions that 
nationwide class actions may have a detrimental effect by foreclosing 
adjudication by a number of different courts and judges, and of increasing, in 
certain cases, the pressures on this Court’s docket.”72 The Court went to state 
that it “often will be preferable to allow several courts to pass on a given class 
claim in order to gain the benefit of adjudication by different courts in 
different factual contexts.”73 For those reasons, the Court concluded that, “a 
federal court when asked to certify a nationwide class should take care to 
ensure that nationwide relief is indeed appropriate in the case before it, and 
that certification of such a class would not improperly interfere with the 
litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts.”74  
Nevertheless, Califano concluded that nationwide injunctions might be 
appropriate in certain limited situations:  
Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of 
equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is 
dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the 
geographical extent of the plaintiff class. If a class action is 
otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over the claims of 
the members of the class, the fact that the class is nationwide 
in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief afforded 
the plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary to 
redress the complaining parties.75 
F. Article III “Case” and “Controversy” Requirement 
Under the U.S. Constitution, the federal judicial power is not 
unlimited.76 On the contrary, Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
the judicial power is limited to the resolution of “cases” and 
 
71 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
72 Id. at 702. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See Wasserman, supra note 5, at 359–60. 
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“controversies.”77 In applying the case and controversy requirement, the 
Court has made it clear that the federal courts should not issue “advisory” 
opinions,78 that they should not hear cases in which the plaintiffs lack 
standing,79 and that there must be concrete adverseness between the parties.80 
Moreover, a case may not be ripe for review if the potentially affected person 
does not suffer a credible threat of prosecution.81 
Of course, in many cases in which nationwide injunctions are sought, 
plaintiffs frame their request for relief as a “class action,” which protects a 
broad range of plaintiffs—some presently before the court, some not. Some 
commentators have argued that the class action, therefore, provides courts 
with a solid basis for issuing nationwide injunctions.82 However, this type of 
analysis creates potential problems. A court may think that it understands the 
full ramifications of a requested injunction, and it may think that it fully 
understands who will be affected by an injunction and how they will be 
affected, but the court may not be correct.  
In some instances, the trial court’s action represents an obvious 
overreach. For example, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,83 even though 
the parties had settled the underlying case, so that an Article III case or 
controversy no longer existed, the trial court decided to go ahead and decide 
the merits of the case and issue a nationwide injunction. The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed, concluding that the settlement deprived plaintiffs of standing 
to litigate the case.84 Likewise, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,85 
 
77 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”). 
78 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
79 See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006); 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
80 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
81 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136 (1967); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
82 See Frost, supra note 6, at 1084 (“The class action device further demonstrates that courts have 
the constitutional authority to enjoin defendants from taking action affecting nonparties. Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a few named individuals can bring a lawsuit on behalf of all similarly situated 
individuals across the nation as long as they satisfy the four class certification requirements listed in Rule 
23(a), as well as Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirement that the ‘party opposing the class has acted . . . on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.’”). 
83 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 490–92 (2009). 
84 Id. at 500–01. 
85 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
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although the lower courts concluded that plaintiff’s injuries were sufficient 
to warrant the entry of a nationwide injunction, the Court held that plaintiffs 
lacked standing.  
In some cases, the U.S. Supreme Court reverses or limits the scope of 
an injunctive decree because the trial court’s order went well beyond the 
parties before the court. For example, in Trump v. International Refugee 
Assistance Project,86 although the lower courts enjoined the Trump 
administration from enforcing an executive order against anyone, the Court 
decided to limit the scope of the injunction to protect only those individuals 
who had a “bona fide” relationship with a person or entity in the U.S.87 and 
to lift the injunction as to individuals who did not have a bona fide 
relationship.88 The Court found that the government’s interest was “at its 
peak” when individuals with no bona fide relationship to the U.S. are 
involved.89 Finding that the individual respondents had such a bona fide 
relationship, the Court left the injunction in place as to them. Had the trial 
court kept its focus on the parties before it, rather than certifying a nationwide 
class that included individuals not before the court, the court’s order might 
not have been so overbroad.90 
Likewise, in Califano v. Yamasaki,91 which involved the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s attempt to recoup 
overpayments made to beneficiaries under the Social Security Act, the trial 
court purported to certify a nationwide class composed of “all individuals 
eligible for [old-age and survivors’ benefits] whose benefits have been or will 
be reduced or otherwise adjusted without prior notice and opportunity for a 
hearing.” The court of appeals agreed with the lower court and held that to 
require recipients to sue individually would result in an unnecessary 
duplication of actions and, therefore, that class relief was appropriate and that 
a nationwide injunction could issue. Indeed, the court of appeals concluded 
that it “is unlikely that differences in the factual background of each claim 
will affect the outcome of the legal issue.” The U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed, concluding that the certified class was overbroad because it swept 
 
86 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
87 Id. at 2087. 
88 Id. at 2087–88. 
89 Id. at 2088. 
90 Id. (“But the injunctions reach much further than that: They also bar enforcement of § 2(c) 
against foreign nationals abroad who have no connection to the United States at all. The equities relied on 
by the lower courts do not balance the same way in that context. Denying entry to such a foreign national 
does not burden any American party by reason of that party’s relationship with the foreign national. And 
the courts below did not conclude that exclusion in such circumstances would impose any legally relevant 
hardship on the foreign national himself.”). 
91 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
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in individuals who had not filed requests for reconsideration or waiver.92 
Indeed, there was evidence suggesting that the number of individuals affected 
was relatively small and that the matter probably should have been handled 
through individual adjudication.93 
G. Encouraging Forum Shopping 
If federal courts have the power to issue nationwide injunctions, then 
potential plaintiffs have powerful incentives to “forum shop” and to try to 
place their cases before judges who are inclined to issue the requested 
injunctions.94 It probably comes as no surprise that challenges to Obama-era 
rules were brought initially in the (relatively conservative) Texas federal 
courts and were appealed to the (relatively conservative) Fifth Circuit U.S. 
Court of Appeals. By contrast, it will come as no more of a surprise that many 
challenges to Trump administration actions are brought before (relatively 
liberal) California federal court judges and, therefore, appealed to the 
(relatively liberal) Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.95 
Moreover, as Bray indicates, prospective plaintiffs need only find a 
single judge who is willing to grant a nationwide injunction in order to 
prevail:  
The opportunity for forum shopping is extended by the 
asymmetric effect of decisions upholding and invalidating a 
statute, regulation, or order. If a plaintiff brings an individual 
action seeking a national injunction, and the district judge 
 
92 Id. at 704 (“The relief to which the Secretary objects in this Court is the determination that he 
must afford class members an opportunity for a prerecoupment oral hearing. With respect to that relief, 
the classes certified were plainly too broad. Both the Elliott and the Buffington classes included persons 
who had not filed requests for reconsideration or waiver in the past and would not do so in the future. As 
to them, no ‘final decision’ concerning the right to a prerecoupment hearing has been or will be made.”). 
93 Id. at 314–15 (“Nowhere in the opinion of the district court is there any estimate of what 
percentage of the annual VA caseload of 800,000 these cases comprise, nor is there any more precise 
description of the class. There is no question but what the three named plaintiffs and the plaintiff veteran’s 
widow asserted such claims, and in addition there are declarations in the record from twelve other 
claimants who were asserting such claims. The evidence contained in the record, however, suggests that 
the sum total of such claims is extremely small; in 1982, for example, roughly 2% of the BVA caseload 
consisted of “agent orange” or “radiation” claims, and what evidence there is suggests that the percentage 
of such claims in the regional offices was even less—perhaps as little as 3 in 1,000.”) 
94 Bray, supra note 2, at 457. 
95 Id. at 459–60 (“It is no accident which courts have given the major national injunctions in the 
last three administrations. In the George W. Bush Administration, it was federal courts in California. In 
the Obama Administration, it was federal courts in Texas. Now, in the Trump Administration, the national 
preliminary injunctions have come from federal courts in several less conservative circuits (the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Ninth). The forum selection happens not only for the district court, but also for the appellate 
court. The pattern is as obvious as it is disconcerting. Given the sweeping power of the individual judge 
to issue a national injunction, and the plaintiff’s ability to select a forum, it is unsurprising that there would 
be rampant forum shopping.”). 
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upholds the challenged law, that decision has no effect on 
other potential plaintiffs. But if one district judge invalidates 
it and issues a national injunction, the injunction controls the 
defendant’s actions with respect to everyone. Shop ‘til the 
statute drops.96 
One can legitimately inquire whether it is desirable to encourage forum 
shopping for such important national issues. Such injunctions, if 
improvidently granted, can tie up federal programs for a considerable period 
of time—at least until the U.S. Supreme Court can review and overturn those 
injunctions. And these roadblocks have been thrown up against both 
Republican and Democratic policies. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although nationwide injunctions have become increasingly 
commonplace, especially during the Trump administration, they are not 
necessarily a welcome or desirable addition to the law. Not uncommonly, 
lower courts “get it wrong.” Indeed, in an extraordinary number of cases, 
lower court injunctions have been completely overturned or significantly 
modified by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Nationwide injunctions also may have an undesirable impact on the law. 
Instead of allowing issues to percolate their way to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and providing that Court with the views and analysis of a variety of lower 
court judges, cases involving nationwide injunctions often move quite 
quickly through the court system and are rapidly presented to the Court. 
Undoubtedly, this rapid pace of review is attributable to the significance of 
the injunction that the lower court issued (e.g., that it purported to enjoin 
governmental action nationwide). 
In the past, the U.S. government has been able to adopt a position of 
non-acquiescence to lower court decisions. In other words, it agrees to accept 
the decision in the particular jurisdiction in which a decision was rendered 
but continues to maintain a contrary position in other jurisdictions. Generally, 
if the government continues to lose in these other jurisdictions, that is the end 
of the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court is disinclined to review the matter. 
On the other hand, if the government’s position prevails in other jurisdictions, 
the U.S. Supreme Court eventually intervenes because there is a split among 
the circuits that needs to be resolved. By that point, the facts and the legal 
issues have come into sharper focus and the U.S. Supreme Court can more 
readily decide the issues.  
As a result, even some supporters of nationwide injunctions recognize 
that nationwide injunctions encourage forum shopping, politicize the courts, 
 
96 Id. at 460 (emphasis in original). 
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create the risk of conflicting injunctions, and potentially give enormous 
power to a single district court judge.97 Professor Bray argues that injunctions 
should not protect non-parties.98 
 
 
97 See Frost, supra note 6, at 1067. 
98 Bray, supra note 2, at 469. 
